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Commentators on higher education in the 1970s have noted that 
American colleges and universities have begun to have "diplomatic 
relations" with foreign nations. Japan and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for example, have used dollar surpluses in their banks to 
endow professorships in the United States. Some of the most active of 
these nations have been Middle Eastern oil-producers, which not only 
have endowed professorships but also have donated their "petro-dollars" 
to establish centers for Arab studies. In addition, many thousands of 
students from oil-rich nations have matriculated in the United States in 
the 1970s. These dollars have been a windfall for educational institu-
tions throughout the country, for they have arrived at a time of declining 
enrollment and economic retrenchment. 
These funds, however, have caused disturbing questions to be asked. 
Why, for example, would Arab nations want to finance the establishment 
at Georgetown University of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies? 
Why would the Libyan government want to give $750,000 to Georgetown 
for the creation of a chair in Arab culture? Critics have charged that 
Arab nations want to influence the working perspective of the many 
hundreds of foreign service officers who receive their education at George-
town's School of Foreign Service. Moreover, why would Saudi Arabia 
donate $1,000,000 to the University of Southern California to endow 
the King Faisal Chair of Islamic and Arabic Studies, and why would 
American corporations provide the remainder of the endowment for 
this chair? (One of these, the Fluor Corporation, did more than 
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$270,000,000 of business in Saudi Arabia in 1977.) Some observers have 
suggested that the desired goal has been to propagandize the United 
States on behalf of anti-Israeli movements, and they have urged Ameri-
can universities not only to scrutinize such proposals in order to deter-
mine their purposes and to see if they have come with strings attached, 
but also to avoid making opportunistic responses which they might later 
regret. What is at stake, these critics have argued, is the integrity of 
higher education in the United States.1 
Yet the attempted use of American colleges and universities by 
foreign governments is not new. Well over forty years before the emer-
gence of the current controversy, there was another imbroglio in the 
"diplomatic relations" between American colleges and universities, on 
the one hand, and foreign countries, on the other. In the 1930s Nazi 
Germany was eager to maximize and publicize whatever pro-Nazi senti-
ments it could detect in American institutions of higher education. Fore-
most among the educational institutions which the Nazis hoped to 
manipulate for propaganda profits was Harvard, the nation's oldest 
college. 
Presiding over Harvard in the 1930s was an organic chemist, James 
Bryant Conant. And while Harvard had institutional constraints to 
surmount in negotiating with the Nazis, Conant had a deep personal 
dilemma to overcome: he was a Germanophile who was very much in 
the intellectual debt of German science, and yet it was the German 
government itself which was destroying that heritage. The painful 
realities of Hitler's Germany were deep in Conant's consciousness as he 
sat down in 1939 to draft his autobiographical note for the twenty-fifth 
anniversary report of his Harvard College Class of 1914. Conant by 
1939 had been Harvard's president for six years, and Adolf Hitler had 
been dictator of Germany for the same period during which the Nazis' 
contempt for the German tradition of academic freedom had reduced 
world-famous universities like Berlin, Heidelberg and Goettingen to 
little more than Nazi propaganda factories. Through "the last twenty-
five years of my own personal experience the word Germany has kept 
recurring like a theme song," Conant wrote his classmates. His "own 
personal reactions to such words as pro-German and anti-German" had 
"boxed the compass at least twice." The world teetered on the brink of 
another world war as Conant composed his autobiographical note. "Must 
it all happen again?" he asked.2 
Between 1933 and 1939 Nazi Germany was to present Harvard and 
her president with an ugly dilemma. It was "the dilemma," Conant ex-
plained, "of those abroad who had friendly feelings for Germany but 
detested Hitler." If Harvard continued to maintain normal relations 
with the German universities as fellow members of the international 
intellectual community, this could be easily interpreted as recognition 
of, and indeed acquiescence in, the death of academic freedom in Ger-
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many. "A friendly act" toward 
Germany in the 1930s, Conant 
recalled, could ''always be 
misinterpreted as a friendly 
act toward Hitler. On the 
other hand, a repudiation 
of Hitler could always be 
interpreted as a repudiation 
of Germany."3 The impact of 
Nazism on the universities 
had become apparent only 
weeks after Hitler had as-
sumed power. Brilliant schol-
ars had been forced by the 
"national resurgence" in Ger-
man education to resign or 
retire; and Conant was aware 
of this upheaval, having 
known some of these dis-
placed scholars personally.4 
He also knew, however, that 
there were others still teach-
ing in Germany who were 
trying to resist the Nazis' regi-
mentation of higher educa-
tion, and he feared that 
outright repudiation of the German universities by their American 
counterparts might cause these scholars to feel abandoned. Yet to sit 
by without registering vigorous opposition to this conquest of free 
inquiry by Nazi dogma might be equally dangerous. Conant never was 
able to resolve this dilemma to his satisfaction. 
Several factors compounded Conant's dilemma. First of all, as a 
Germanophile whose model of intellectual excellence and scientific 
achievement was Germany, Conant felt betrayed as he observed the 
Nazi subversion of German higher education in the 1930s. Conant had 
traveled to Germany in 1925 and 1930; while there, he had observed the 
organization of academic and industrial chemistry, and he had marveled 
at the nation's scientific traditions and accomplishments. But he had also 
witnessed that German reactionaries, who had never reconciled them-
selves to the defeat of World War I, were violently opposed to democracy 
in Germany and accepted as reality the myth of the "stab in the back" 
of the German military forces by various international elements, Jews 
and Social Democrats. The Weimar Republic, Conant found during 
his two German trips, was competing for popular support with "an op-
position shadow system consisting of anti-democratic elements" that 
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were ambitious and unscrupulous; and he left Germany in 1930 wonder-
ing how a republic so despised by many conspiratorial citizens could 
long endure. By the early 1930s, the Nazis were emerging as a major 
force, anti-Semitism was rampant and democracy in Germany, Conant 
feared, might well be doomed.5 
Viewing the Nazis as the despoilers of a rich intellectual heritage, 
Conant realized that until they were eradicated Germany could never 
again be true to herself or anyone else. Conant was by then, however, 
an academic leader and a bureaucrat. His constituency was Harvard— 
her alumni, faculty, and students; and this was a constituency which at 
times displayed not only ambiguous feelings toward Germany but even 
pro-Nazi sentiments. As a bureaucrat, Conant was on occasion cautious 
and unwilling to take the risks of leadership. He wanted to avoid 
controversy, even after it was no longer possible to do so and still be a 
sincere opponent of the Nazi regime. Conant also aspired to national 
prominence as an educational leader in the 1930s and, like other Ameri-
can leaders at that time, he sought to rationalize away the products of 
his timidity and avoidance. 
Throughout the early 1930s, refugee scholars from Germany began 
to arrive in the United States, and various groups and private individuals 
established programs to take care of them.6 Among these organizations 
was the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, 
formed to raise funds to endow temporary lectureships for the refugees 
at American universities. Headed by Cornell's President Livingston 
Farrand, it had as members many college and university presidents, in-
cluding those of Princeton, Williams, Bryn Mawr, Northwestern, Car-
negie Tech, Vanderbilt, Chicago, Vassar, Smith, Stanford, California, 
Oberlin and Mount Holyoke. The name of the president of Harvard 
University was conspicuously absent from the membership list.7 
It was not that the executive secretary of the Emergency Committee, 
Stephen Duggan, had neglected to ask Harvard to sponsor a displaced 
German scholar; for he had. Duggan had explained to outgoing Presi-
dent A. Lawrence Lowell that the Committee wanted a score of America's 
best universities to invite refugee professors to serve on their faculties 
for two years, and that to facilitate the program the Committee would 
defray the cost of each professor's salary by up to $2,000 a year. This 
proposition did not appeal to Lowell, however, and with unmistakable 
anti-Semitism he expressed his opinion that Jewish organizations were 
trying to exploit Harvard for purposes of propaganda, and that if Har-
vard were to extend an invitation to a refugee scholar, these organizations 
would not only trumpet the event all over the country, but also would 
do so in an effort to persuade other universities to follow Harvard's lead. 
Viewing the Committee's work as Jewish propaganda rather than as 
humanitarianism in action, Lowell made a negative recommendation to 
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the Harvard Corporation, which voted in late May not to participate 
in the program.8 
Unfortunately, in the confusion of retiring Lowell and preparing to 
install Conant, the Corporation never even acknowledged the offer.0 
Thus the matter hung in limbo throughout the summer, although two 
Harvard professors—Hans Zinsser and Harlow Shapley—were industri-
ously negotiating on their own with both the Emergency Committee and 
the Rockefeller Foundation to bring Dr. Ulrich Friedemann, a German 
bacteriologist, to Harvard.10 Zinsser, also a bacteriologist, had even 
procured from the Rockefeller Foundation an offer to pay one-half of 
Friedemann's salary. These negotiations proceeded throughout the sum-
mer without any orders to the contrary from the Harvard administration. 
Lowell was not in Cambridge and Conant, who had sailed for Europe 
a week after his election, did not return until the end of August; all the 
while, unanswered correspondence piled up on a desk in the administra-
tion building. It was not until Friedemann decided to accept a job in 
London that these negotiations finally broke down.11 
Duggan wrote Harvard again in October, four months after his first 
unanswered letter, and Conant replied promptly and apologetically. 
He was "extremely sorry" for the delay, he wrote, but he had assumed 
that the Emergency Committee had automatically rescinded its offer once 
Friedemann had taken the London appointment. If Duggan wanted 
the Corporation to reconsider its position on future lectureships for 
refugee scholars under the aegis of the Committee, it would do so at its 
next meeting.12 
The Corporation met two weeks later to reconsider the Emergency 
Committee's offer and again rejected it.]3 Conant took a very hard-
nosed position. People sympathetic to the plight of the refugee scholars, 
he claimed, were "apt to mix up charity and education." In order for 
the University to hire a professor, it had to have an opening, and, he 
added, apparently sincerely, "I have not seen many men on the list of 
displaced scholars whom I thought we could use at Harvard." But if one 
of the departments recommended a qualified scholar, then Conant 
would hire him. Salary was another problem; the Emergency Commit-
tee's subsidy of $2,000 was insufficient. Conant also felt that "the best 
chance of a brilliant, intellectual future in America is to give every 
opportunity for our young men to develop." Filling full professorships 
"with imported people of middle age" could well discourage the young 
men; temporary appointments of even distinguished scholars could, he 
argued, "lead only to misunderstandings and do more harm than good."14 
Obviously, time has proved Conant to be wrong. As is now well 
known, much of America's intellectual future, especially in the natural, 
biological, and social sciences, would depend on the contributions of 
refugee scholars. In the fall of 1933, however, Conant felt that foremost 
among his responsibilities as Harvard's new president were those of re-
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cruiting a distinguished faculty and increasing the quality of graduate 
instruction. Indeed, it was Conant's outspoken commitment to building 
an outstanding faculty that was his chief asset in the estimate of the 
Corporation in electing him president. The Emergency Committee's 
program forced him and the Corporation to choose between unpleasant 
alternatives, and they chose the one they thought was in the best interest 
of the University. Perhaps as a more experienced university president, 
Conant would have arrived at a different conclusion. Then, too, Conant 
might have done otherwise had he been acting solely on his own and 
not as Harvard's chief executive officer. Yet he did not plead even in 
private in behalf of the refugee scholars. Conant's position reflected not 
only a failure of foresight, but also a failure of compassion and political 
sensitivity.15 
Harvard's rejection of the Emergency Committee's proposal might 
have encouraged Nazi officials to conclude that Harvard had a policy of 
neutrality toward the new German regime, or at least that the university 
was not strongly anti-Nazi. Conant sensed also that the Nazi government 
might have perceived him as being sympathetic to Germany, since he 
"was known to have been in Germany in 1925 and again in 1930, and 
had a number of German friends, and had shown himself to be sympa-
thetic to the Germans in their predicament as a consequence of the loss 
of the war, inflation, and had even failed to join in any of the denuncia-
tions of the Germans in World War I."16 
Believing perhaps that neither Conant nor Harvard was anti-Nazi, 
one of Hitler's close associates tried to endow a scholarship there in 
1934.1T Ernst F. S. Hanfstaengl was not only a Nazi and Hitler's Foreign 
Press Chief, he was also an alumnus of the Harvard College Class of 
1909. A mammoth, garrulous man with a mop of tousled hair, "Putzi" 
was known less for his intellectuality than for his drinking capacity, his 
ribaldry and his spirited if jangling music-making on the piano. Hitler 
and Hanfstaengl had known each other since the early 1920s. Indeed, 
it was at Hanfstaengl's villa in Ufling, outside Munich, that Hitler hid 
after the abortive "beer hall putsch" in 1923, and where he was arrested 
two days later. They had also collaborated in writing "The German 
Storm," a popular Nazi marching song. Hanfstaengl often boasted that 
whenever Hitler was distraught, he would summon to his quarters his 
old friend "Putzi," who would lull him to sleep by playing Wagner.18 
The gregarious Hanfstaengl had been one of the most popular men in 
his class, and his ties to the United States were close. His mother was 
American, and he later married an American. Hanfstaengl had remained 
in the United States after graduation, becoming the custodian of a 
family-owned photo gallery and reproduction shop on Fifth Avenue. 
But in the final months of World War I the Alien Property Custodian 
had seized these assets and auctioned them off. The government, claimed 
Hanfstaengl in his autobiographical note for the Class's twenty-fifth 
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anniversary report, had auctioned off this property to a Jew; "this may 
serve as a hint to the dear reader as to who in reality won the war." 
Hanfstaengl returned to Germany in 1921. "A year later," he told his 
classmates, "I ran into the man who has saved Germany and civilization 
—Adolph Hitler."1» 
Hanfstaengl announced from Berlin in late March 1934 that he was 
not only "looking forward to [his twenty-fifth class] reunion with the 
greatest anticipation," but also that he had accepted the Chief Marshal's 
invitation to serve as one of his aides. He also said that he might, "as a 
surprise," even bring along a Nazi film which "can show better than 
any words of mine what we Nazis stand for." "Above all," he told re-
porters, he was happy to contribute to his class reunion fund, although 
he would have to deposit his contribution in marks in a German bank 
"for the use of Harvard students coming to Germany to complete their 
university education." This was the first hint of the scholarship that was 
to cause a furor at Harvard.20 
Almost at once many alumni raised a storm of protest against the 
invitation, and surprisingly, a few days later, the Chief Marshal an-
nounced that Hanfstaengl had changed his mind and would not attend 
the reunion.21 The University maintained official silence, saying only 
that both the original invitation and Hanfstaengl's eventual declination 
were wholly the business of the alumni, but later that month Hanfstaengl 
himself amplified the reason for his decision. Although ordinarily he 
would "love to attend," he was simply too "overcrowded to attend." He 
stoutly denied, moreover, that the intent of his visit had ever been 
propaganda. "As for propaganda," Hitler's foreign press aide said, "I 
never made propaganda and I never shall. . . ."22 
That Hanfstaengl was lying became obvious on June 7, when he 
walked into a banking house in Berlin, and wrote out a bank draft for 
2,500 marks payable to President James B. Conant. The purpose of his 
check, he explained to assembled reporters, was to establish the "Dr. 
Hanfstaengl scholarship." Then he handed out copies of a letter he 
had mailed to Conant two weeks before. As "a modest proof" of his 
loyalty to Harvard, the letter read, he had decided to endow a $ 1,000 
scholarship, which would enable a Harvard student to spend six months 
studying in Munich and another six months at any German university. 
These terms, he believed, "would fittingly symbolize my perennial love 
and affection for Harvard, Boston, and New England."23 
Reporters asked Hanfstaengl whether his disclosure of the scholar-
ship meant that he had definitely abandoned all plans to attend the 
reunion. Cryptically, he replied, "Qui vivra verra," an Italian proverb 
meaning, "He who lives will see," and speculation rose again that he 
might still make the trip from Berlin to Cambridge.24 But on June 10 
he remained secluded in his apartment, while the Europa, the last ship 
that could bring him to the United States in time for the festivities, 
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made ready to embark from Cherbourg, France, the next day. It ap-
peared that he had passed up his last chance. 
The next day, however, he booked passage on the Europa. Because 
it was too late then to make train or plane connections to Cherbourg, 
he boarded a late train to Cologne, and then he stowed away among 
the mail pouches on the plane from Cologne which was to deliver the 
last post to the ship. At the last possible moment he proudly marched 
up the gangplank of the Europa minutes before it set sail for the 
United States.25 
The press widely trumpeted Hanfstaengl's dramatic departure, al-
though he maintained that he had staged his exit only to avoid publicity. 
If this were really the goal of his strategy, then for a press secretary, 
supposedly versed in such matters, he committed a series of egregious 
blunders. Much more credible is the explanation that he had carefully 
plotted his visit to the reunion, that he wanted to gain for himself ex-
tensive press coverage and that he hoped his trip to the United States 
and proffered scholarship to Harvard would be of propaganda value to 
the Nazis.26 An example of Hanfstaengl's careful planning concerned 
his luggage, which was scarcely a last-minute rush-job, containing as it 
did a bust of General Paul von Hindenberg, which he hoped to present 
to the United States Military Academy; a bust of Arthur Schopenhauer 
for Harvard's philosophy department; and a bust of Hanfstaengl's favorite 
composer, Christoph Willibald Gluck, for one of Harvard's chapels.27 
Hanfstaengl's pre-arrival publicity aroused a mixed reaction. The 
Harvard Crimson seriously urged the University to confer an honorary 
degree upon him in recognition of his high position in the German 
government.28 His reception in New York City, however, was quite dif-
ferent, for there he was angrily denounced by 1,500 left-wing pickets 
from the Student League for Industrial Democracy and the Anti-Nazi 
Federation, whom he escaped only by debarking secretly onto a tugboat 
and steaming up the Hudson River to an undisclosed destination.29 
Hostile placards greeted Hanfstaengl upon his arrival in Cambridge. 
"Give Hanfstaengl a Degree"; "Master of Concentration Camps"; "Make 
Him a Master of Torture"; "Make Him a Master of Sterilization"; "A 
Bachelor of Bookburning."30 The returning alumni were much more 
cordial, however, welcoming him warmly. Conant spoke to him only 
once—at the president's tea for the returning alumni. When Hanfstaengl 
came down the receiving line to shake the president's hand, he said to 
Conant, "I bring you greetings from Hoenigschmid." Otto Hoenig-
schmid, an internationally-known chemist, had been a postdoctoral fellow 
at Harvard in 1909, studying with Conant's father-in-law, Theodore W. 
Richards, America's first Nobel Prize-winning chemist; and he had also 
been Conant's host in Germany in 1925. But Conant was sure that 
Hoenigschmid was "an ultra-nationalist" and probably a Nazi as well."31 
Hanfstaengl was front-page news almost every day in Boston, the 
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newspapers picturing him as jovial and jocular—as Hitler's "court 
jester." Much of his free time he spent at the piano keyboard, drinking 
tumblers of gin and singing bawdy ballads upon request. His hair was 
dishevelled and his suit wrinkled, but his broad, toothy grin was indeed 
jolly and he looked like an overgrown clown. During the annual class 
day ceremonies in the stadium, he marched with his class in the parade 
and rendered left-handed Nazi salutes to his friends as the band struck 
up "Ach, du lieber Augustine." This brought roars of delight from the 
stands, as did the antics of the members of the Class of 1924 who in 
imitation strutted in goose-step and extended stiffly their right arms 
Nazi-style.32 
It was traditional for Harvard's president to address the gathering 
of the Alumni Association on commencement afternoon, and Conant 
had just about finished his speech—in which he denounced attempts of 
"reactionary intolerance or revolutionary zealotry" to subvert "our aca-
demic halls"—when two young women suddenly cast off shawls they had 
been wearing and chained themselves to the wooden stands on which 
the alumni were sitting. Anti-Nazi slogans in red ribbon adorned their 
dresses. "Down with Hitler," the slogans demanded. Hurriedly they 
locked their chains and threw away the keys, and as policemen rushed 
over to eject the women, they began screaming denunciations of the 
"fascist butchers," Hanfstaengl and Hitler. The police had to rip out 
part of the stands to unfasten the chains, and all the while the women 
continued to inveigh against Nazism. Finally the police carried them 
away. Later that afternoon, seven more demonstrators were arrested in 
Harvard Square. One had handcuffed himself to the fence surrounding 
the Harvard Yard, while another had climbed a telegraph pole and from 
this lofty point had launched a harangue against Hitler.33 
Throughout the country and even on the floor of Congress others 
protested against both Hanfstaengl's visit and Harvard's calm and even 
convivial acceptance of him. Congressman Emanuel Celler asked the 
American people to give "no quarter" to him and his "gang of marauders, 
hooligans, and torturers."34 Others called his presence at Harvard a 
disgrace to the University.35 
Meanwhile, Hanfstaengl was imbibing in high society, sporting a 
blazer and skimmer for the Harvard-Yale boat races in New Haven and 
morning clothes for a fashionable Newport wedding. He took time out, 
however, to return to Cambridge to dispose of his busts of famous Ger-
mans; but he arrived to find the University practically deserted, and 
only after several hours of persistently pacing the halls of University 
buildings was he able finally to donate the sculpture of Gluck to the 
music department's chairman, who was locking up his office before 
leaving for his summer vacation. With his other sculptures he flew to 
West Point where the Academy rebuffed his offer of the Hindenburg 
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bust. When he sailed for home in early July his two art works accom-
panied him on the voyage.36 
Since the Corporation did not meet in the summer, it would not 
vote until September on whether to accept the "Dr. Hanfstaengl scholar-
ship." Hanfstaengl's name remained in the headlines, however, for in 
early August, he sang a paean of praise of his "Leader" in a major article 
in Collier's. "Like President Roosevelt," he wrote, Adolf Hitler "has 
given Germany a 'new deal' and . . . new hope for the future." "For years 
and years" the Jews in Germany had been like so many "leeches feeding 
on the body politic." They had also "enthusiastically embraced the 
role of pacemaker for Bolshevism"; they were "the dead branches" on 
the tree that was Germany. Hitler, he concluded, was simply the 
"surgeon" destined by fate to cut off these dead branches "so that the 
tree could take on new life."37 
Another incident at this time tended to reinforce the impression 
that Harvard was still unready to denounce Nazi Germany. Dean 
Roscoe Pound of the Law School had been on a tour of Germany that 
summer, and several times in the course of his trip he had congratulated 
Hitler for bringing domestic tranquility to the country, at one point 
even predicting the rise of a similar leader in France. So pleased were 
Nazi officials that the University of Berlin decided to award Pound an 
honorary degree. The ceremony was to take place in Boston's Ritz-
Carlton Hotel in September, and Pound invited Conant to attend, an-
nouncing that the German Ambassador Hans Luther would be there to 
confer the degree. Conant accepted but only reluctantly, for he was 
certain the Nazis were exploiting Pound and indirectly the University, 
a view which he shared with Judge Julian Mack, Charles A. Beard and 
others.38 The weekend before the ceremony, an old friend and classmate, 
A. Calvert Smith, visited Conant, and together they drafted a brief 
speech which was "not very pleasant" to the Nazi regime. Just in case 
the affair turned out to be unadulterated propaganda, he wanted to be 
armed with an incisive rebuttal. 
In conferring the degree, however, Luther made an innocuous speech. 
But when photographers asked Conant to pose with Luther and Pound, 
he bristled. "I'm not in it," he asserted vehemently. "It's strictly a 
matter between these two gentlemen. I'm not in it."39 
At its first meeting of the autumn semester, the Corporation considered 
the "Dr. Hanfstaengl scholarship." Certain that the Nazis would herald 
acceptance of the gift as tantamount to recognition of the "new Ger-
many"—and certain also that Hanfstaengl had planted his offer for just 
that purpose—the Corporation voted to refuse it. The refusal, the 
Corporation believed, could be so worded as to be a rebuke to National 
Socialism rather than an affront to the German people or universities. 
Indeed, Conant felt as he drafted the Corporation's reply that it should 
be an encouragement to the democratic elements still struggling in Ger-
58 
many. "We are unwilling," he wrote, "to accept a gift from one who 
has been so closely connected with the leadership of a political party 
which has inflicted damage on the universities of Germany through 
measures which have struck at principles we believe to be fundamental 
to universities throughout the world/'40 
The press throughout the country generally applauded this rebuff. 
Scores of letters arrived at Conant's office and most were favorable; the 
few critical letters consisted mostly of anti-Semitic diatribes, a few even 
signed "Heil Hitler!"41 The only faculty member to sound a discordant 
note in public was a professor of comparative literature, Francis P. 
Magoun, who wired Hanfstaengl that Harvard alumni were "ashamed on 
account of the action of the University Corporation." But Magoun's 
pro-Nazi sentiments were well-known, especially after he wrote a letter 
to the editor of the Boston Herald in early October extolling National 
Socialism as representative of "the highest aspirations of our western 
civilization."42 The Corporation wrote an addendum to the Hanfstaengl 
affair by promptly declining an offer by a wealthy German-educated resi-
dent of Cambridge to finance a year's study in Germany "along the lines 
suggested by Dr. Hanfstaengl." It was quite unwilling, the Corporation 
informed the prospective donor, to accept a gift made as "a direct re-
placement" for one it had already refused.43 
Conant believed that his and Harvard's anti-Nazi views were now 
squarely on the record. In 1935, moreover, the University conferred 
honorary degrees upon two ardent anti-Nazis, Albert Einstein and 
Thomas Mann, and Heinrich Bruening, one of the last chancellors of the 
Weimar Republic, came to Harvard as a lecturer.44 In addition, Conant 
took pains at this time to denounce Nazism's pernicious educational 
doctrines. "The suppression of academic freedom, rigid censorship, the 
abolition of individual liberty of opinion," he told Harvard's freshman 
class in 1935, ". . . are perfectly consistent with the aims" of the German 
rulers.45 When Conant denounced Nazism, as he did increasingly in 
the mid-1930s, he did so almost solely because of its smothering of aca-
demic freedom, not because he viewed Nazi Germany as a threat to 
America's national security. As a "group movement supported by a 
dogmatic philosophy," National Socialism was "necessarily impatient of 
the detached thinker and observer and will ride him down at the slightest 
provocation."46 It idealized utilitarian education while outlawing truth 
for truth's sake. It imposed dogma on the student. It extinguished 
academic freedom. It was rooted in a deep distrust of free inquiry. This 
same distrust, Conant often added, was also the impetus behind the noisy 
clamor in the United States for teachers' loyalty oaths.47 
In the eyes of some observers, Harvard's anti-Nazi posture suffered 
two minor blows in 1935. In April, 2,000 people, most of them Harvard 
students, disrupted a peace demonstration in Cambridge. Jocularity dis-
tinguished the behavior of the disrupters, who, according to a newspaper 
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account, "paraded the yard and the purlieus of Cambridge in true im-
perial German style—goose-stepping, giving the straight-arm salute made 
popular by Adolf Hitler, and singing war songs." Trying to be humorous 
and mirthful, they also shouted "Heil!" "Down with peace!" and "We 
want cannon!" Hey wood Broun, for one, did not think the marchers 
and their slogans were "really very funny, after all." Writing in the 
New York World-Telegram, Broun opined that, while this was "intended 
to be awfully, awfully funny," it was, instead, "horror heaped on hor-
ror."48 Later in 1935, Harvard along with numerous other institutions 
—trade unions, city councils, religious organizations—received requests 
that it join in the movement to boycott the forthcoming Olympic Games 
in Berlin. Replying to these requests, Conant stated that American par-
ticipation in the Olympic Games was not a proper question for Harvard's 
consideration; and he added with some pride that, in rejecting Hanf-
staengl's fellowship, Harvard had become "the only university in this 
country" to take "a definite stand in expressing hostility to the present 
German government." He noted, however, that he did "not believe that 
the way to fight intolerance is with more intolerance." If there were 
assurances, and Conant understood there were, "that the Games will be 
handled properly, I am inclined to think that the best thing we can do 
to help the whole cause of democracy and liberty is to go ahead and give 
the Germans an illustration of something they know so little about,— 
namely, tolerance."49 
Conant was still not ready publicly to oppose Nazism on any basis 
other than that of academic freedom. Early in 1936, for example, the 
magazine The American Hebrew voted Conant its annual "Medal for 
the Promotion of Better Understanding between Christian and Jew in 
America." Conant's rebuke to Hanfstaengl had commended him for the 
medal, and the magazine singled out for praise his defense of intellectual 
and academic freedom, stating that "publicly and eloquently he warned 
America . . . against the dangers to free and untrammeled thinking in-
herent in Nazism and Facism . . . ." But Conant declined the medal. 
He explained that in "taking my stand against the forces which have 
threatened liberty both in this country and abroad, I have been actuated 
solely by my conviction of the importance of academic freedom, entirely 
irrespective of considerations of race or religion." Although this was 
largely why the magazine had voted to make the award, Conant feared 
that his acceptance "would becloud the fundamental issue of freedom 
by placing my action on a more limited basis . . . ."50 Reasoning some-
what as former President Lowell had in rejecting the Emergency Com-
mittee's proposition in 1933, Conant wanted Harvard's rejection of 
Hanfstaengl's offer to be judged not as pro-Jewish, but as anti-Nazi. At 
the same time, there is no doubt that Conant's unwarranted and para-
noiac suspicion of Jewish groups had further muddled the goal of a 
united front against Nazi Germany.51 
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Conant seemed not to understand that he would have to continue to 
state his anti-Nazi views each time the issue arose. He was mistaken to 
believe that he could remain not only mute but also uninvolved with 
other anti-Nazis as the evidence of Nazi repression and brutality mounted 
in the mid-1930's. He was also mistaken to believe that he could oppose 
Nazi Germany on academic grounds alone while publicly ignoring other 
and related Nazi crimes. 
Two academic pageants in 1936 attracted worldwide attention; one 
was a monument to free inquiry, the other to dogma. Harvard ob-
served her 300th birthday, while ancient Heidelberg University cele-
brated her 550th. Nazism had already left its ugly imprint on Heidelberg. 
On the facade of one of her beautiful edifices there had once been an 
inscription "To the Living Spirit," but this the Nazis had ripped down 
and replaced with a swastika and the legend "To the German Spirit." 
Almost one-fourth of Heidelberg's faculty had been fired or coerced 
into resigning.52 
The rector of Heidelberg invited universities from all over the world 
to send delegates to the forthcoming festivities in June, but there was 
something suspicious about this birthday party. It was indeed rare for 
a university to celebrate anything but a centennial or a multiple thereof; 
yet this was the 550th anniversary. The date was also suspect. Heidel-
berg's birth had actually been in October 1386. The anniversary festival 
was to be June 30, 1936, or precisely two years after the bloody Nazi 
purge in which scores of Nazis had been summarily executed because of 
an alleged plot against Hitler's regime, leading some observers to believe 
that the date of the birthday had political rather than historical 
significance. 
The British universities reacted to the invitation swiftly and de-
cisively, beginning with a letter to the Times of London from the 
esteemed Bishop of Durham, who wrote that British representation at 
Heidelberg "could not but be understood everywhere as a public and 
deliberate condonation of the intolerance which has emptied the Ger-
man universities of many of their most eminent scholars . . . ."53 Soon 
afterwards, Oxford voted to boycott the celebration, and every other 
British university quickly followed suit. Many European universities— 
including Stockholm, Oslo and Amsterdam—also joined the boycott.54 
The response of America's colleges and universities was neither as 
unanimous nor outspoken. Many institutions such as Michigan, Yale 
and Columbia announced that they would send delegates, while others, 
such as the University of Virginia, "promptly, firmly and politely de-
clined." Harvard in early March accepted the invitation, announcing 
that she would send a delegate in recognition of "the ancient ties by 
which the universities of the world are united and which are independent 
of the political conditions existing in any country at any particular 
time."55 
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Conant undoubtedly anticipated the massive criticism that was in 
store for him and the University. It had not been an easy decision, and 
he and the Corporation had weighed the alternatives with great care. 
But in its rebuke to Hanfstaengl, Conant argued, Harvard had been able 
"to express most forcefully and strikingly our disapproval of the Nazi 
regime." That was "the point at issue." It would be unfortunate for 
Harvard or any other university to protest against Hitler's government 
"by breaking off diplomatic relations with German universities . . . ." 
This distinction between the Nazi government and the German univer-
sities was critical to Conant. He also argued that "if one allows political, 
racial, or religious matters to enter into a question of continuing aca-
demic and scientific relations one is headed down the path which leads 
to the terrible prejudices and absurd actions taken by scientists and 
universities during the World War." Conant reminded his critics that 
Harvard had invited Nazis such as the rector of Heidelberg to her Ter-
centenary. Of course, this, too, had been criticized. But would it be 
better, he asked, to invite only those scholars and university officials who 
had been "investigated" and "found to be free of all taint of Nazism?" 
Harvard had also invited a Nazi chemist to the Tercentenary simply 
because of his brilliant scientific contributions.56 The Nazi regime was 
the proper target for censure, not the universities, for to ostracize them 
could only destroy "the unity of the learned world."57 
A far more practical reason also motivated Conant. Not wanting to 
invite reciprocal boycotts of Harvard's own Tercentenary celebration, he 
sought diligently to avoid injecting the issue of Nazism into academic 
pageants. In addition, the Tercentenary was to be not only an academic 
celebration but also an occasion for fund raising. "What my views 
would have been," he admitted a year later to Princeton's President 
Harold W. Dodds, "if we had not been celebrating our Tercentenary, 
I cannot tell you." Yet he knew that expediency had motivated him, 
and in explaining Harvard's acceptance he readily granted that he could 
have been simply "rationalizing a situation into which circumstances 
forced us!"58 
Unlike Harvard, where the reaction of the academic community had 
been relatively mild, Columbia University students and faculty alike 
castigated President Nicholas Murray Butler for Columbia's acceptance 
of Heidelberg's invitation.59 Student demonstrations and faculty peti-
tions had apparently rankled Butler, for he proposed that Columbia, 
Harvard and Yale issue a joint statement or perhaps three identical but 
separate statements, which would not only condemn Nazism but also 
testify to a belief in the unity of the academic world.60 Conant at first 
thought this idea was worth exploring further, but after more reflection 
he concluded that it was "very ill-advised." Harvard had already re-
sponded to Heidelberg's invitation and another statement would be 
gratuitous. But he offered a counter proposal. If the Heidelberg anni-
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versary turned out to be a celebration not to honor Heidelberg but to 
commemorate the "blood purge"—or if "someone . . . on that occasion 
hails the delegates from American universities as being a recognition on 
our part of the triumphs of the Nazi regime"—then the three presidents 
should issue a joint statement denouncing the perversion of an academic 
ceremony into a political orgy. Both Butler and Yale's President James 
R. Angell agreed to the new strategy. Conant was frankly fearful that 
the Nazis were scheming to degrade this celebration, and he was ready 
in that event "to stand by for a rebuttal" from his critics.61 
When a Nazi military review launched the festival, it was obvious 
that the purpose of the Heidelberg anniversary was not to honor the 
University but to glorify the Third Reich. The Propaganda Ministry 
of Joseph Goebbels had had charge of all arrangements, and instead of 
parading scholars in colorful robes, there were squads of students in 
drab brownshirt uniforms. Swastikas were everywhere in evidence. 
Storm troopers marched through the streets. Hitler wired at the last 
moment that he would not be there, but most of the Nazi hierarchy at-
tended, including Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Heinrich Himmler, 
Joachim von Ribbentrop and Hanfstaengl. Pure Nazi ideology filled 
the speeches, as professors affirmed that German education does "not 
know or recognize truth for truth's sake or science for science's sake." 
The purpose of German education, declared a philosophy professor, was 
"the formation of human beings and racial life in accord with the char-
acter and natural laws of the community."62 
Conant glanced at the press coverage of the celebration with appre-
hension, but what he read relieved his anxieties. "Of course," he wrote 
Angell, the speakers "pronounced a lot of nonsense about education and 
research, nonsense which . . . is not only absurd but dangerous." Nobody, 
however, had claimed that American representation was tantamount to 
acceptance of the Nazification of higher education. Nor had there been 
"reference to the fact that Harvard by sending a delegate had reversed 
its decision on the Hanfstaengl matter," and the Nazis had not even 
mentioned the "blood purge" of two years before.63 Angell and Butler 
concurred, and on the flimsy excuse that the Nazis had not exploited 
the presence of Americans—even though they had indeed prostituted 
the festival—the three presidents withheld their denunciatory statement. 
Conant once again had resorted to rationalization in order to avoid 
controversy. 
The other academic pageant of worldwide importance in 1936 was 
Harvard's Tercentenary. Prior to the ceremonies in mid-September there 
had been scattered protests against inviting Nazis or Nazi sympathizers 
—for example, against the Rector of Heidelberg and Carl Jung, who had 
assumed the editorship of the Zentralblatt fur Psychothérapie in late 
1933, after his Jewish predecessor had been dismissed, and whose recent 
work, some people argued, indicated a predisposition to racial concepts 
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of Aryan superiority. Other people asked, Why Jung? Why not Sigmund 
Freud? While not responding publicly to the criticism of Jung's invita-
tion, Conant explained that Harvard would "welcome the Rector of 
Heidelberg . . . as a representative of an ancient university" and "in spite 
of his Nazism." "We shall invite him not as an individual but as a 
symbol of the continuing tradition of German scholarship."64 Conant 
also contended that the University had already forthrightly opposed 
the Nazi government, and "to carry over that point from politics to the 
world of learning" was "to fight intolerance with intolerance"; and he 
noted that Harvard's invitation list included anti-Nazis like Einstein, 
the classicist Werner H. Jaeger and the historian Friedrich Meinecke.65 
Einstein, however, apparently found explanations such as Conant's to 
be unpersuasive; his empty seat at the Tercentenary that autumn was a 
striking reminder of his boycott of the celebration. At the time, news-
papers reported that Einstein had declined to attend because his wife 
had been too ill to accompany him. Years later, he conceded that his 
reason for not participating "was not so much the presence of Dr. Jung 
but the fact that representatives of German universities had been invited, 
although it was generally known that they were in full cooperation with 
Hitler's acts of persecution against Jews and liberals, and against cultural 
freedom in general."66 
Promptly at 9:30 on the morning of September 18, 1936—the final 
day of the Tercentenary—a bugle sounded throughout the rainswept 
Harvard Yard, rallying alumni to their respective class assemblies and 
the march to the soaked seats of the outdoor Tercentenary Theatre. 
Through loudspeakers a voice announced that President Conant had 
consulted a meteorologist who had told him that the rain would last 
only a half an hour; and when Professor Samuel Eliot Morison began 
to read his "Early History of Harvard," the rain indeed stopped. The 
ceremonies had been free of political connotations—anti-Nazi or other-
wise—until Governor James Michael Curley, fiery leader of Boston's 
Hibernians and Democrats, lauded the durability and continued suc-
cesses of the Democratic party by observing that a Democratic President 
had attended Harvard's 250th birthday; now, on its 300th anniversary, 
"an equally able and courageous"—and Democratic—President was an 
honored guest. And before the degree-granting ceremony was well under 
way, a hearty torrent drenched the spectators again.67 
So heavy was the downpour that the Alumni Association retreated 
to Sanders Theatre that afternoon to hear Franklin D. Roosevelt of the 
Class of 1904 speak. Also on the program was an arch-foe of Roosevelt's 
New Deal tax policy, Yale's President Angell, who could not resist the 
temptation to take a dig at the President. Thinking of the soggy cere-
mony, he gibed that he had overheard one alumnus complain upon leav-
ing the deluge that morning that "this is evidently Conant's way of 
soaking the rich."68 Whatever politics had been injected into the 
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Tercentenary had been done so, not by pro- or anti-Nazis, but by Demo-
crats and Republicans, carrying on the three-and-a-half year old debate 
over the glories and dangers of the New Deal. For their part, Conant 
recalled, "the Germans behaved themselves very well," being "very 
cautious in what they said . . . ."G9 
Germany hosted another academic festival in 1937—the 200th anni-
versary of the Georg August University of Goettingen. The ugly scar 
of Nazism was on this university, too; Goettingen's birthday party 
promised to be a repeat performance of the farce at Heidelberg. Again 
the British universities voted unanimously against the sending of dele-
gates, and this time only a handful of American colleges and universities 
accepted the invitation.70 
Conant again found himself in a quandary, but it was a quandary 
of his own making. Rather than being straightforward, he waffled once 
again. Conant acknowledged that Heidelberg had been a disillusioning 
spectacle, yet he still felt it was essential to maintain the solidarity of 
the intellectual world; Harvard should not sever "diplomatic relations" 
with her German counterparts.71 The Corporation was noncommittal in 
acknowledging Goettingen's invitation, writing only that it would "en-
deavor to send" a delegate.72 For Harvard to refuse absolutely to send 
anybody, Conant believed, would be "ridiculous," since "we crossed 
that bridge last year when we sent a delegate to Heidelberg." "Whether 
we actually succeed in finding a delegate," however, " . . . is in the laps 
of the gods." "Personally," Conant recommended to the Corporation, 
"I see no reason why we should make any effort to send a delegate."73 
The Corporation concurred, notifying Goettingen that it would be un-
able to send a representative.74 
This decision was variously interpreted; the Harvard Crimson, for 
example, criticized the University's "snub" to Goettingen.75 The secre-
tary to the Corporation, Jerome D. Greene, maintained, however, that 
Harvard had not rebuffed anyone. It was not that she had refused to 
send a delegate; no faculty member had been available to go.76 And, 
indeed, Greene had tried diligently to commission the Dean of the School 
of Business Administration to attend the celebration. Greene's effort 
somewhat baffled Conant, whose intention it had been—and he felt it 
had also been the Corporation's—"that we should neither rebuff the 
University by refusing to send a delegate nor go out of our way to honor 
them by sending a personal delegate, as we did in the case of Heidel-
berg."77 The Crimson obviously was not alone in its reading of Harvard's 
intentions. Many people either applauded or condemned the University 
for refusing to send a delegate.78 The only people who seemed truly to 
understand what Harvard had done were those people who criticized 
her for not declining outright to send a delegate to Goettingen. 
Conant was one of the first Americans to recognize the menace of 
National Socialism, and his ideas on Harvard's relations with German 
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universities in the 1930's were fairly consistent. These ideas seem also 
to have been the primary influence on the Corporation's decisions. Yet 
it was easy to misread what Conant meant. When he rebuked Hanfs-
taengl, his real target was the Nazi regime that had degraded the German 
universities. But his acceptance of Heidelberg's invitation did not mean 
that he had changed his mind about Hitler's government. Even though 
the Nazi Gleichschaltung, or coordination, of totalitarian ideology and 
higher education had reduced Heidelberg to little more than a Nazi 
echo chamber, Conant truly believed that this university should not be 
ostracized. Her tradition of free inquiry would flourish long after Hitler's 
regime had been destroyed; meanwhile, Harvard's delegate was a testi-
mony to "the unity of the learned world." Those who viewed Harvard's 
acceptance of the Heidelberg invitation as acquiescence in National 
Socialism were just as wrong as those who saw Harvard's absence at the 
Goettingen celebration as a repudiation of Goettingen. At the same 
time, Conant could have rebuked the Nazi government for degrading 
the Heidelberg celebration—indeed for disrupting the unity of the 
learned world—and if had intended not to send a delegate to Goettingen, 
he should have explicitly declined the invitation. 
The history of Harvard's "diplomatic relations" with Nazi Germany 
presents the historian with a perennial problem, that of retrospective 
moralizing, judging an individual's or an institution's actions from the 
comfort of forty years of hindsight. Still, the historian should not re-
treat from the responsibility of evaluating and, ultimately, judging. And 
there is a lesson here: It is that higher education in the United States 
has historically had an intimate relationship to political events both at 
home and abroad. Although the problem today of "Petro-Dollars for 
Scholars" is only the most current manifestation of the relationship, 
America's higher educational leaders have always been loathe to concede 
that such a connection exists. For decades, it seems, only conservatives 
railed against the relationship, and they did so by arguing that federal 
funding of colleges and universities carried with it the threat of federal 
control over higher education. What about funding by mammoth cor-
porations or by oil-rich foreign nations? Here, too, there is a risk, and 
it is one to which all scholars and academic leaders should be alert. But 
it is perhaps the historian alone who can apprize the public of the pro-
portions of the threat based on this study of past experience; and, in 
the defense of academic freedom and independence, the historian has 
an obligation to do so. 
Although he was timid at crucial moments and inconsistent at others, 
Conant still was one of the more outspoken anti-Nazis in the United 
States from 1933 to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. But as a 
university president, he was not really a free agent; and he was not alone 
in his reticence. Leaders with constituencies to serve—whether they 
were university presidents with alumni, faculty, and students, politicians 
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with voters, corporate executives with customers and employees, or labor 
officials with union members—were notoriously silent in the 1930's. And 
their silence must have been encouraging to Hitler and the Nazis. 
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